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I. INTRODUCTION
ETSI found itself in a bind. A leading French nonprofit organization
focused on standardizing transmission frequencies across telecommunications
networks worldwide,' the European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI) had played a major role in promoting global interoperability of
telecommunications equipment using cutting-edge technology.2
Yet, the selection of one set of technological standards for a network
invariably means the exclusion of another, which often invites accusations of
anticompetitive conduct.3 As a result, it was unsurprising when, in 2012,
TruePosition, a developer of cellular telecommunications products whose
network architecture was denied inclusion in ETSI's list of standard network
formats, sued ETSI and several other firms alleging a conspiracy to deny
TruePosition access to the global communications market.4 As discovery
proceeded, however, ETSI argued that it could not produce much of the
evidence sought by TruePosition because cooperating with American-style
discovery requests in France is criminalized under the country's so-called
"blocking statute." 5 Indeed, the French Court of Cassation had just enforced
the blocking statute for the first time in In re Advocat "Christopher X" -and
had levied heavy penalties against the offending lawyer.
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1. About ETSI, ETSI, http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/AboutETSI/AboutEtsi.aspx (last visited
Oct. 22, 2012).
2. Introduction, ETSI, http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/AboutETSI/Introduction/introduction.aspx
(last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
3. See, e.g., S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern
ofAntitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283, 284-85 (1996).
4. TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., No. 11-4574, 2012 WL 707012, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 6, 2012) (order denying motion for protective order).
5. Id. at *3.
6. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] Paris, crim., Dec. 12, 2007,
Bull. crim., No. 7168 [JurisData No. 2007-83228] (Fr.) [hereinafter Christopher X].
7. Benjamin L. Klein, Note, Trust, Respect, and Cooperation May Keep Us Out of Jail: A
Practical Guide To Navigating the European Union Privacy Directive's Restrictions on American
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 38: 217
Nevertheless, the TruePosition court-like virtually every court before
it-proceeded to demand the production of documents from ETSI directly
using the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). The court did so in spite of
the existence of the Hague Conventions, a pair of treaties designed to bridge the
gap between common-law jurisdictions like the United States and civil-law
jurisdictions like France with respect to discovery procedures. Indeed, France's
blocking statutes explicitly seek to channel the production of evidence to
American courts through the Hague Conventions by criminalizing the
production of evidence for foreign courts through any other process. French
entities like ETSI that are subjected to American litigation thus find themselves
in the
whipsaw of competing requirements engendered by discovery demands to
foreign litigants in U.S. courts, or those with non-U.S. data, [which] subject
them to the Hobson's Choice that may lead them to ask the following question,
when faced with a U.S. court order requiring production in litigation: "Do you
prefer I go to jail here, or there?" 8
American courts have wrongly disregarded Christopher X, placing French
companies that operate in the United States uniquely in peril when faced with
litigation. In particular, American courts have failed to recognize the rising tide
of data protectionism in France heralded by the French Court of Cassation's
opinion and by the increasingly hostile policy posture towards American-style
discovery of the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libert6s
(CNIL), the French agency charged with protecting data privacy. Without
showing the appropriate degree of solicitousness when deciding whether to
enforce a subpoena, American courts are raising the likelihood that French
companies will face criminal punishment at home. As a result, the Supreme
Court should abandon the approach of applying the comity analysis articulated
in its most recent jurisprudence determining how to elicit evidence located in
France and instead designate the Hague Conventions as the first-resort set of
procedures for procuring such evidence.
Part II of this Comment examines the Hague Conventions, which provide
the procedures guiding the execution of international requests for discovery
material, and the French blocking statutes, which effectively designate the
Hague Conventions as the only mechanism legal under French law by which an
American court can obtain evidence located in France. Part III reviews the line
of precedent that authorizes American courts to disregard the Hague
Conventions and to compel discovery from French entities, even if doing so
would implicate the French blocking statues. It also examines the French Court
of Cassation's decision in Christopher X, which, despite heralding a tectonic
shift in the enforcement of the French blocking statutes, has been explicitly
Discovery Procedure, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 623, 624 (2012) (noting that the French Supreme Court
had upheld a fine of 10,000 euros against the defendant).
8. AM. BAR Ass'N, ABA FULL REPORT AND RESOLUTION ON CROSS BORDER EDISCOVERY
AND PRIVACY: MIDYEAR MEETING 2012, at 5 (2012), http://files.ali-aba.org/files/coursebooks/pdfNCT
0502_chapter.05.pdf.
218
Christopher X and CNIL
discounted by American courts. Part IV argues that American courts have
underestimated the impact of Christopher X and the recent policy shifts
announced by CNIL, and that the principles of fair competition undergirding
the cases establishing jurisdiction over foreign entities necessitate a new look at
how courts should compel production of evidence residing abroad.
II. THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND THE FRENCH BLOCKING STATUTES
The Hague Conventions, which consist of the Hague Service Convention 9
and the Hague Evidence Convention,10 provide the framework under which
judicial bodies may obtain discovery of evidence located in foreign countries.
Each signatory nation to the Hague Conventions, including the United States
and France, must designate a "central authority" that receives subpoenas from
foreign courts, which, if deemed by the central authority to comply with the
relevant Convention, are then transmitted to an appropriate judicial body for a
response." Under the terms of the Hague Conventions, a nation's central
authority must comply with the foreign court's subpoena if doing so would
comport with the host nation's laws; if not, the central authority must
accomplish service to whatever extent is allowed by the host nation's laws. 12
When seeking to obtain information through the Hague Conventions, American
courts may impose sanctions on parties that do not provide the desired
information.13 If the party does not provide such information, courts apply a
multifactor test to determine whether to impose sanctions.14 At the same time,
foreign nations may choose to employ different methods of obtaining evidence
outside those provided for in the Hague Conventions.' 5 In addition, the Hague
9. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361 [hereinafter Hague Service Convention].
10. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18,
1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555 [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention].
11. Id. art. 2; Hague Service Convention, supra note 9, art. 2. The Department of Justice
serves as the central authority for the United States. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 471 cmt. c (1987).
12. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 10, art. 12; Hague Service Convention, supra
note 9, art. 13; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
471(2)(c) (1987); see also G. Brian Raley, A Comparative Analysis: Notice Requirements in Germany,
Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, 10 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 301, 308 (1993)
(describing Article 13 of the Hague Service Convention as important for "limiting the scope of a state's
power to refuse requests for service to cases involving national sovereignty"); T. Bradbrooke Smith,
Cross-Border Litigation Involving Canadian and U.S. Litigants, 17 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 261, 271 (1991)
("Article 12 of the Hague Evidence Convention ... authorizes a refusal to execute letters rogatory where
the state addressed considers that such a request would prejudice its sovereignty or security.").
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442(l)(b)
(1987).
14. Id. § 442 cmt. h; see also Keith Y. Cohan, Note, The Need for a Refined Balancing
Approach When American Discovery Orders Demand the Violation of Foreign Law, 87 TEX. L. REV.
1009, 1019-20 (2009) (discussing the typical methodologies used by courts when determining whether
to impose sanctions).
15. See Joseph F. Weis, Jr., The Federal Rules and the Hague Conventions: Concerns of
Conformity and Comity, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 903, 914-15 (1989) ("As is true in the Service
Convention, ... signatories [to the Hague Conventions may] arrange for more liberal procedures by
separate arrangements between themselves. The two Conventions are similar also in that they apply only
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Conventions allow signatory nations to declare preemptively that they will not
enforce certain pretrial discovery orders if doing so would conflict with
domestic law.' 6 France is one such country, having passed a law limiting
pretrial discovery of documents.' 7
In addition to passing its law limiting pretrial discovery, France has
sought to funnel all foreign requests for discovery through the Hague
Conventions by passing "blocking statutes." Relevantly, French Penal Code
Law No. 80-538 provides as follows:
Article IA. Subject to treaties or international agreements and applicable laws
and regulations, it is prohibited for any party to request, seek or disclose, in
writing, orally or otherwise, economic, commercial, industrial, financial or
technical documents or information leading to the constitution of evidence with
a view to foreign judicial or administrative proceedings or in connection
therewith.
Article 2. The parties mentioned in [Article IA] shall forthwith inform the
competent minister if they receive any request concerning such disclosures.1 8
In theory, the French blocking statute criminalizes the production of
evidence in any proceedings conducted outside of the Hague Conventions.' 9
Criminal penalties would apply irrespective of whether a French party provided
evidence in response to a request by an American court or if it delivered to an
American entity any information of the sort encompassed by the blocking
statute. 20 However, for years after passing the law in 1980, France showed little
interest in enforcing the blocking statute.21 This absence of enforcement
appears to have emerged largely from the law's symbolic original intent, as the
to civil and commercial matters. Both Conventions provide only the minimum. In that sense, the
Evidence Convention does not establish an exclusive method of securing evidence.").
16. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 10, art. 23; see Brian Friederich, Note,
Reinforcing the Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad After Blocking Statutes, Data Privacy
Directives, and Arospatiale, 12 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 263, 273 (2010).
17. Carla L. Reyes, Note, The U.S. Discovery-EU Privacy Directive Conflict: Constructing a
Three-Tiered Compliance Strategy, 19 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 357, 367 n.63 (2009); accord
Ddclaration faite par la France le 9 avril 1975 dans le cadre de l'article 23 de la Convention de La
Haye du 18 mars 1970 [Declaration Made by France on April 9, 1975, Pursuant to Article 23 of the
Hague Convention of March 18, 1970], HAGuE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, Apr. 9, 1975,
http://www.hcch.net/index en.php?act=status.comment&csid=501 &disp=resdn.
18. Loi 80-538 du 16juillet 1980 relative A la communication de documents et renseignements
d'ordre 6conomique commercial ou technique A des personnes physiques ou morales 6trang6res [Law
80-538 of July 16, 1980 relating to the Communication of Economic, Commercial, Industrial, Financial
or Technical Documents or Information to Foreign, Natural or Legal Persons], J. OFFICIEL DE LA
RtPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 17, 1980, p. 1799. This translation was
taken from Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 526 n.6 (1987).
19. See, e.g., Bates C. Toms III, The French Response to the Extraterritorial Application of
United States Antitrust Laws, 15 INT'L L. 585, 614 (1981) ("The provisions of Article [IA] have, as their
main purpose, to have observed in France the rules which define the procedures for obtaining evidence
abroad." (translating Questions et R6ponses du 29 septembre 1980 [Questions and Responses of
September 29, 1980] D6bats Parlementaires Assembl~e Nationale [Parliamentary Debates, National
Assembly], J. OFFICIEL DE LA RtPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Jan. 26,
1981, p. 373)).
20. See In re Vitamin Antitrust Litig., Misc. No. 99-197, MDL No. 1285, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25070, at *53-54 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2001).
21. Id.
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blocking statute was passed to prevent the U.S. Department of Justice from
enforcing American antitrust laws against France-based shipping cartels. 2 2
When those cartels subsequently dissolved, French authorities did not begin
using their authority to rebuff the increasingly aggressive jurisdictional reach of
American courts into French entities. 2 3 On this basis, American courts
repeatedly compelled the production of evidence from French parties without
concern that such parties would face criminal prosecution in France, a critical
24building block of the cases that undermined the Hague Conventions.
III. AMERICAN COURTS AND THE ASSERTION OF EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION
Despite the United States being a signatory to the Hague Conventions,
American courts have routinely asserted the power to demand evidence held by
foreign entities through the FRCP. In the seminal case on this issue, Societe
Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers,25 the Supreme Court announced that a district court could "order a
party subject to its jurisdiction to produce evidence even though the act of
production may violate [a blocking] statute."26 Though it granted that a foreign
party could secure a reprieve from a subpoena after making a good-faith
attempt to comply, the Court provided trial judges wide latitude to decide
whether to impose sanctions on recalcitrant foreign parties. 2 7
With the principle established that courts can enforce subpoenas by using
their power to sanction foreign parties, subsequent courts have focused on
identifying the circumstances in which this power should be asserted. Thirty
years after Rogers, a bare majority of the Supreme Court, led by Justice
Stevens in Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. U.S. District Court for
22. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442
n.4 (1987); see also SPENCER WEBER WALLER ET AL., ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, SPECIAL DEFENSES IN
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION 97-98 (1995) (describing the rationales for the development of
various European blocking statutes).
23. See Toms III, supra note 19.
24. In response, the French National Assembly adopted a bill on January 23, 2012, that
narrowed the scope of the blocking statute to include only documents containing sensitive business
secrets. C6cile Di Meglio, Reform ofthe French Blocking Statute: Towards a Restriction oflts Scope of
Application, PARIS INT'L LITIG. BULL. No. 3, May 2012, at 9, 9. The author of the bill argued that
narrowing the blocking statute's scope would cause American courts to take the statute more seriously.
See M. BERNARD CARAYON, RAPPORT FAIT AU NOM DE LA COMMISSION DES LOIS
CONSTITUTIONNELLES, DE LA LtGISLATION ET DE L'ADMINISTRATION GtNtRALE DE LA RtPUBLIQUE SUR
LA PROPOSITION DE LOI (NO. 3985) DE M. BERNARD CARAYON VISANT A SANCTIONNER LA VIOLATION
DU SECRET DES AFFAIRES, ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE NO. 4159, at 22-25, 31-33 (2012),
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/pdf/rapports/r4159.pdf (noting American courts' disdain for the
French blocking statute and American law's respect for the protection of business secrets). The bill was
then transmitted to the French Senate on January 24, 2012. Proposition de loi adoptee par l'Assemblee
nationale, visant A sanctionner la violation du secret des affaires, S6nat No. 284 (2012),
http://www.senat.fr/leg/ppll -284.pdf. However, the French Senate has yet to act upon the bill.
25. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
26. Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Abrospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482
U.S. 522, 544 n.29 (1987) (citing Rogers, 357 U.S. at 204-06).
27. See Rogers, 357 U.S. at 212.
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the Southern District ofIowa, declined to mandate that the Hague Conventions
be the first resort for eliciting evidence held abroad; rather, Adrospatiale
directed trial courts to conduct a multifactor "particularized analysis" guided by
the "concept of international comity" when considering whether to request
evidence through the Hague Conventions or through a direct subpoena enforced
28by sanctions under the FRCP. The Court defined "comity" for purposes of
this analysis as "the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal
approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of other
sovereign states."29 Relevant factors for performing this test include the
"particular facts, sovereign interests, and likelihood that resort to those [non-
Hague Convention] procedures will prove effective."30
Justice Blackmun argued in dissent that courts should apply a "general
presumption" to "resort first to the [Hague] Convention procedures,"3' in no
small part because civil-law jurisdictions impose restrictions on evidence-
gathering procedures due to differing views on how to protect the "underlying
substantive rights" of the parties. 3 2 Ignoring the only means of obtaining
discovery to which other countries have consented, Justice Blackmun warned,
would come "to the detriment of the United States' national and international
interests" 33 by demonstrating "insensitivity to the interests safeguarded by
foreign legal regimes." 34 In short, the "price tag" for ignoring the Conventions
would include "the predictable long-term political cost that cooperation will be
withheld" when American courts seek to conduct discovery abroad. s
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens' perspective has clearly carried the day in
the lower courts. Subsequent courts have applied several iterations of the
international comity test that emphasize different factors, such as whether the
"competing interests of the nations whose laws are in conflict,"36 whether a
foreign court will adequately protect the parties' rights,37 and whether the
foreign entity made a good-faith attempt to obtain the desired evidence. 38
28. Airospatiale, 482 U.S. at 543-44.
29. Id. at 543 n.27 (citing Emory v. Grenough, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 369, 370 n.* (1797)). The
Court also cited with approval the definition of "comity" provided in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
163-64 (1895), in which the Court described "comity" as the "recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both
to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws." A&ospatiale, 482 U.S. at 543 n.27.
30. Airospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544.
31. Id. at 548-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. Id. at 558.
33. Id. at 548.
34. Id. at 567-68.
35. Id. at 568.
36. First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 22 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Minpeco,
S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
37. Cf Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 901 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (describing the consideration
of whether a foreign court will protect the parties' rights as falling under the umbrella of "considerations
of comity" in the context of deciding whether an American court should exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over foreign patent infringement claims).
38. See Reino De Espana v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, No. 03-CIV-3573, 2005 WL 1813017,
at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2005).
222
Christopher X and CNIL
Despite this proliferation of tests, courts have rarely ruled in favor of
foreign entities asserting their domiciles' blocking statutes as a defense against
complying with a subpoena. As one appellate court put it in true
understatement, "Societe Internationale did not erect an absolute bar to
summons enforcement and contempt sanctions whenever compliance is
prohibited by foreign law."39 A district court judge captured the attitude of
most courts in reasoning that foreign corporations that, "as a means of
advancing their profit-making businesses in the United States, incorporated
under the laws of the United States and then placed their [products] in this
country's stream of commerce, have little to complain about when served with
enforceable discovery requests under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 40
Critical to this assessment has been the assumption-historically correct-that
a French party would incur no real penalties from complying with the
American court's subpoena, since French blocking statutes do "not appear to
have been strictly enforced."41 Most recently, some American judges have
reasoned that, since a French corporation would experience no "hardship" from
complying with the subpoena and French authorities have apparently chosen
not to react to intrusions by American courts, steep fines should be imposed on
intransigent foreign parties. Such fines-as high as ten thousand dollars per day
42
of noncompliance-have been upheld by appellate courts.
The French Court of Cassation's decision in Christopher X could have
changed that calculus.43 In Christopher X, the California Insurance Department
(CID) sued French insurer Mutuelle d'Assurance Artisanale de France (MAAF)
in federal court in connection with allegations of fraud. During the litigation,
the court issued various requests for evidence under the Hague Evidence
Convention from MAAF located in France. A French lawyer, acting as an agent
of the lawyers representing the CID, took the initiative to call a former director
of MAAF to speak about various events germane to the fraud allegation.
Thereafter, MAAF filed a criminal complaint against the French lawyer
complaining of violations of the blocking statute.44 The Paris Court of Appeal
held, and the French Court of Cassation affirmed, that the lawyer had
independently "bypassed the Hague Convention procedures and approached an
39. United States v. Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1287 (9th Cir. 1981).
40. In re Aircrash Disaster near Roselawn, 172 F.R.D. 295, 300 (N.D. Ill. 1997); see also John
T. Yip, Addressing the Costs and Comity Concerns of International E-Discovery, 87 WASH. L. REv.
595, 617 (2012) ("Since Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Airospatiale, few lower courts have ordered
discovery under the Hague Convention.").
41. Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482
U.S. 522, 527 (1987); accord In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 5571, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 85211, at *16-17 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2006); Soletanche & Rodio, Inc. v. Brown &
Lambrecht Earth Movers, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 269, 271 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
42. See, e.g., First City, Tex.-Hous., N.A. v. Rafidain Bank, 281 F.3d 48, 51, 55 (2d Cir.
2002); Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1480-82 (9th Cir. 2002).
43. See Christopher X, supra note 6.
44. Christina Taber-Kewene & C6cile Di Meglio, Four Years After Christopher X: U.S.
Courts Afford French Blocking Statute Little Deference, INT'L L.Q., Winter 2012, at 1, 61.
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ex-director for the defendant, without his consent, for a statement."45
Exercising their powers under the blocking statute for the first time,4 6 French
authorities fined the lawyer ten thousand euros, though many "observers
believe that if the lawyer involved in the incident had not been a French
national, he might have been sentenced to jail." 47 A subsequent decision from
the Criminal Chamber of the French Court of Cassation extended the scope of
Christopher X to the production by French citizens of "contractual documents
held on the U.S. territory by American attorneys."48
Some commentators believed that these decisions would alter American
courts' treatment of foreign defendants in matters relating to discovery. 4 9
Indeed, although France has not launched any subsequent criminal prosecutions
under the blocking statute, anecdotal evidence suggests that some multinational
firms are avoiding locating facilities in the United States due to fear of being
opened up "to intrusive, and often extravagantly expensive investigative
discovery"50 and due to a widely held perception that related criminal penalties
"will likely increase in the future, exacerbating cross-border discovery
conflicts." 5'
Nevertheless, American courts have not accepted that, after Christopher
X, French parties are truly at risk of liability for acceding to requests for
discovery outside the Hague Conventions. Although Christopher X was
decided in 2007, only four American courts have explicitly referenced the case.
In the first such reference, the court noted that the lawyer who solicited
evidence outside the Hague Conventions had done so on his own initiative,
rather than in response to an order by an American court.52 Even though the
French Court of Cassation did not identify this difference as relevant in
determining whether to apply the blocking statute,53 the court nevertheless
45. Shannon Capone Kirk et al., When U.S. E-Discovery Meets EU Roadblocks, NAT'L L.J.,
Dec. 22, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=12024F26918666&s
Ireturn=1&hbxlogin=1.
46. See In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merchant Discount Litig., No. 05-MD-1720,
2010 WL 3420517, at *7 n.15 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010) (citing Marc J. Gottridge & Thomas Rouhette,
'Blocking' Statutes Bring Discovery Woes, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 30, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/law
technologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=900005634407&BlockingStatutesBring.DiscoveryWoes).
47. Seth Berman, Cross-Border Challenges for E-Discovery, 11 BUS. L. INT'L 123, 128
(2010).
48. Taber-Kewene & Di Meglio, supra note 44, at 61 (citing Cour de cassation [Cass.],
[supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Jan. 30, 2008, JurisData No. 06-84.098 (Fr.)).
49. See, e.g., SEDONA CONFERENCE, FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF CROSS-BORDER
DISCOVERY CONFLICTS 21-22 (2008); Gareth T. Evans & Farrah Pepper, Court Holds U.S. Discovery
Rules Trump French Law and Hague Convention, DIGITAL DISCOVERY & E-EVIDENCE, Dec. 1, 2009, at
1, 3; Kathleen Braun Gilchrist, Note, Rethinking Jurisdictional Discovery Under the Hague Evidence
Convention, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 155, 162 (2011).
50. Robert Hardaway, Dustin D. Berger & Andrea Defield, E-Discovery's Threat to Civil
Litigation: Reevaluating Rule 26 for the Digital Age, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 521, 523 (2011).
51. SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 49, at 5.
52. In re Global Power Equip. Grp., Inc., 418 B.R. 833, 849 n.7 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009).
53. See Pierre Grosdidier, The French Blocking Statute, the Hague Evidence Convention, and
the Case Law: Lessons for French Parties Responding to American Discovery, HAYNES & BOONES
LLP, 31-32, http://www.haynesboone.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Attomey%20Publications/French
_BlockingStatute_08-24-1 1.pdf (last updated Aug. 2011).
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concluded on this basis that the defendant in the case at hand had "presented no
evidence to suggest that [it] . . . faces a significant risk of prosecution if it
complies with the discovery requests pursuant to an order of [the] Court."5 4
This same reasoning was applied in the contexts of a private suit alleging
anticompetitive conduct (the TruePosition case),'55 an antitrust enforcement
action,56 and a patent infringement suit.57 In each of these cases, irrespective of
whether the French party had exhibited good faith in attempting to comply with
a discovery request, the court ordered the production of evidence over the
objection that complying with the order would violate the French blocking
statute.ss In short, Christopher X appears not to have affected the Rogers and
Aerospatiale line of cases. As Part IV demonstrates, American courts should
reevaluate Christopher X and the substantial impact it portends for French
companies engaged in American litigation.
IV. REEVALUATING CHRISTOPHER X AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF
SUBPOENAS ABROAD
American courts have analyzed Christopher X in isolation from the
broader trend towards data protectionism in France. Unchecked, the continued
enforcement of subpoenas outside the Hague Conventions framework threatens
to accelerate this trend by increasing the pressure on French companies to
comply with discovery requests, which, in turn, will increase the likelihood that
those companies will face sanctions at home. Given these developments, the
Supreme Court should revisit Airospatiale and return the Hague Conventions
to their proper place as a first resort for eliciting the production of evidence
from abroad.
American courts have disregarded the French trend toward restricting the
dissemination of data in connection with legal proceedings outside France.
Writing in April 2008, one prominent French litigator noted the interesting
coincidence in timing of the Christopher X ruling and the announcement of the
newest policies of CNIL, the French administrative agency charged with
regulating data privacy issues.s9 Shortly before the publication of Christopher
X, CNIL announced its intention to identify policy responses to complaints
from French companies "stemming from their legal obligations under U.S. law
to . .. collect data for pretrial discovery."60 While CNIL did not offer any
54. 418 B.R. at 850.
55. TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., No. 11-4574, 2012 WL 707012, at *6 n.6
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 6,2012).
56. In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 278 F.R.D. 51, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
57. MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Rexam PLC, No. 1:1Ocv5ll, 2010 WL 5574325, at *2 n.l (E.D.
Va. Dec. 14, 2010).
58. See supra cases cited in notes 52-57; see also Grosdidier, supra note 53, at 20-22
(describing the minimal degree of deference post-Adrospatiale courts have shown to the French
blocking statutes).
59. See Marie Danis, Sanction de la communication illicit de renseignements d une autorit6
judiciaire itrangdre, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE ENTREPRISE ET AFFAIRES, Aug. 28, 2008, at 21, 26 (Fr.).
60. Beryl A. Howell & Laura S. Wertheimer, Data Detours in Internal Investigations in EU
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specific policy recommendations at the time, it did suggest that it would begin
working with the European Union to develop procedures for resisting further
intrusion by American courts.
Subsequent CNIL policy pronouncements show that this resistance is
growing. In July 2009, CNIL issued guidelines affirming that any "transmission
of information in the context of a 'Discovery' procedure must be conducted in
accordance with the Hague Convention."61 American court orders to obtain
evidence outside the Conventions are said to be "without force" in France,62
and any party that complied with such orders risks fines and imprisonment
under the French blocking statute.6 3 Nevertheless, American courts have
disregarded this growing assertiveness,64 leading two scholars to conclude that,
decades after the first international discovery cases "and the first of the
Blocking Statutes, the U.S. and foreign countries are actually moving further
apart, rather than finding solutions to this intractable problem."65
This trend underscores the prescience of Justice Blackmun's dissent in
Adrospatiale and demonstrates that the time has come for Adrospatiale to be
"reexamined to ensure that lower courts are . .. demonstrating respect 'for any
sovereign interest expressed by the foreign state."' The political blowback
that Justice Blackmun predicted twenty-five years ago 67 should now prompt the
Court to restore the Hague Conventions as the first resort for conducting
international discovery and abandon the case-by-case comity analysis. The
fundamental problem with taking a case-by-case comity approach in this
instance is that it duplicates and misinterprets the comity analysis that the
participants in the Conventions already took into account when drafting the
treaties. The Hague Conventions represent a compromise that sought to bridge
the gap between civil law and common law jurisdictions that take
fundamentally different approaches to obtaining and reviewing evidence. When
negotiating and drafting the Conventions, the signatory nations "considered the
factors that are relevant to a comity analysis" and, in doing so, "represented the
Countries: Part II, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Nov. 2008, at 38, 38; see also SNP Boat Serv. S.A. v.
Hotel Le St. James, No. I l-CV-62671-KMM, 2012 WL 1355550, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2012)
(holding that a French party's attempt to avoid complying with a discovery order "based on its claim
that French authorities are only now enforcing the statute does not change the sovereignty considerations
underlying the Supreme Court's analysis of the French blocking statute," and so the lower court "did not
abuse its discretion when it disregarded the French blocking statute").
61. Deliberation No. 2009-474 of23 July 2009 Concerning Recommendations for the Transfer
of Personal Data in the Context of American Court Proceedings Known as "Discovery," COMM'N
NATIONALE DE L'INFORMATIQUE ET DES LIBERTES 3 (2009), http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/en
/D-DiscoveryEN.pdf
62. Id. at 2.
63. Id. at 3.
64. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
65. Lawrence W. Newman & David Zaslowsky, The Conflict in Production of Documents
from Abroad, N.Y. L.J., July 22, 2010, at 2.
66. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 306 (3d Cir. 2004) (Roth, J.,
concurring) (quoting Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987)).
67. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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sovereign interests of the signatory states better than individual litigants
possibly could." 68 The signatory nations compromised significantly in agreeing
to the Conventions, and the United States thereafter "agreed to honor the
commitments which the [Conventions] contain[]." 69 Applying a comity
analysis at best duplicates the efforts of the Hague Conventions negotiators
and, at worst, undermines them.
Moreover, the Supreme Court should recognize the French backlash
against the American circumvention of the Hague Conventions-embodied in
both the Christopher X decision and the CNIL policy announcements-as an
expression of the perception of the comity analysis as fundamentally unfair and
illegitimate. In many respects, the courts' tendency to disregard potential
blocking statute liability after performing comity analyseS70 confirms the thesis
that comity analysis typically leads courts to engage in "discriminatory
classification of litigants with equal claims to forum governance," resulting in
courts favoring one particular group of litigants.n In other words, comity
analysis results in courts treating American and French litigants differently
based upon their countries of origin and the courts' interpretation of those
countries' interests in having their laws enforced, even though the parties
themselves have equal claims to having their rights vindicated in the court
forum. Indeed, scholarly views of Adrospatiale-era decisions applying comity
analysis to the question of whether to apply the Hague Conventions suggest a
consistent judicial bias in favor of circumventing the Conventions entirely, 72
which uniquely and unfairly subjects French litigants to liability. This result
represents a significant erosion to the rule of law.7 It also ignores the fact that
the Hague Conventions were crafted specifically to "avoid offending notions of
judicial sovereignty prevailing in many civil law nations." 74 Adrospatiale
allows American courts to ignore the balance of sovereign interests
incorporated in the Conventions themselves.
This current state of affairs is fairly ironic in light of the fact that the
historical purpose of comity analysis was to "mediate conflicts between
68. James G. Dwyer & Lois A. Yurow, Taking Evidence and Breaking Treaties: Aerospatiale
and the Need for Common Sense, 21 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 439, 471 (1988); accord Russell
J. Weintraub, The Need for Awareness of International Standards When Construing Multilateral
Conventions: The Arbitration, Evidence, and Service Conventions, 28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 441, 458-61
(1993).
69. Weis, supra note 15, at 931.
70. See supra notes 52-57.
71. Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 87 (1991).
72. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Incredible Shrinking Hague Evidence Convention, 38
TEX. INT'L L.J. 73, 74 (2003); Gary B. Born & Scott Hoing, Comity and the Lower Courts: Post-
Abrospatiale Applications of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 INT'L LAw. 393, 401-05 (1990); Weis,
supra note 15, at 920 n.92 (citing Timothy S. Cole, Note, The Hague Evidence Convention: Determining
Its Applicability Through Comity Analysis, 38 SYRACUSE L. REv. 717, 743 (1987)). The alternative to
the Hague Conventions, the FRCP, allow for the production of evidence through procedures largely
outside the supervision of the presiding judge, which is anathema to the procedures used in civil-law
jurisdictions. See Born & Hoing, supra, at 396.
73. Weinberg, supra note 71, at 87.
74. Born & Hoing, supra note 72, at 396.
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sovereigns" with the goal of ."assur[ing] judicial efficiency and [reflecting]
abiding respect for other courts.'" 75 The idea that comity analysis should be
used to promote harmony among nations has been repeated by a number of
scholars elsewhere, including both then-Judge Breyer76 and Justice Scalia.n By
applying a comity analysis instead of looking first to the Hague Conventions-
which are the most concrete and direct expression of how the United States and
France wish to reconcile differences in their methods of taking discovery-
American courts have only worsened the conflict that the Conventions were
initially implemented to solve. The rise of data protectionism in France and the
response by CNIL and the French courts to invasive American discovery
methods proves that the purpose for which the Adrospatiale Court crafted its
three-part comity test to determine how best to take discovery has not served
the interest for which it was created.
Therefore, the Supreme Court should reconsider its ruling in A&ospatiale
and create a presumption in favor of first using the Hague Conventions to
conduct international discovery.78 Concerns about the relative efficiency of the
Hague Conventions79  would be best addressed through reforms
institutionalized through negotiations of the party nations, rather than
piecemeal through the courts. Adopting the position of Justice Blackmun's
dissent is the best way to ensure the ongoing cooperation of French institutions
in effectuating American discovery requests while eliminating the whipsaw that
has bedeviled French defendants for over three decades.
75. Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as
Conflict ofLaws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 60-61 (2010) (quoting Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc.
v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 590 F.2d 1209, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 445 U.S. 375 (1980)).
76. Howe v. Goldcorp Invs., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 950 (1st Cir. 1991).
77. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993).
78. Gilchrist, supra note 49, at 178.
79. See, e.g., Kristen A. Knapp, Enforcement of U.S. Electronic Discovery Law Against
Foreign Companies: Should U.S. Courts Give Effect to the EU Data Protection Directive?, 10 RicH. J.
GLOBAL L. & Bus. 111, 116-22 (2010).
80. Many courts have commented on the relative slowness of obtaining evidence through the
formal process of letters of request established by the Hague Conventions. See, e.g., Seoul
Semiconductor Co. v. Nichia Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 832, 837 (E.D. Tex. 2008); In re Aspartame
Antitrust Litig., No. 2:06-CV-1732-LOD, 2008 WL 2275531, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 2008) (order
granting plaintiffs motion to compel); Hagenbuch v. 3B6 Sistemi Elettronici Industriali S.R.L., 2005
WL 6246195, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2005). In response, scholars have proposed various reforms to
the Hague Conventions to reflect the speed of contemporary electronic communication and the
complexity of modem litigation. See, e.g., Gary B. Born, The Hague Evidence Convention Revisited:
Reflections on Its Role in U.S. Civil Procedure, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 96-101 (1994)
(advocating, among other reforms, greater clarity in the scope of discovery covered by the Hague
Conventions, time limits for executing requests for evidence, and greater equality in the treatment of
litigants); Marissa L.P. Caylor, Note, Modernizing the Hague Evidence Convention: A Proposed
Solution to Cross-Border Discovery Conflicts During Civil and Commercial Litigation, 28 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 341, 372-87 (2010) (suggesting that diplomatic tension over international discovery requests could
be defused by establishing minimum data protection standards, clarifying the definition of common-law
pretrial discovery, and creating a special administrative channel for managing complex evidence
requests); Friedrich, vupra note 16, at 295-97 (recommending reforms to the text of the Hague
Conventions themselves, including a provision releasing litigants from liability so long as the procedures
outlined in the Hague Conventions are followed).
228
2013] Christopher X and CNIL 229
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that the current practice of applying a case-by-
case comity analysis to determine whether to opt for the Hague Conventions or
the FRCP in taking discovery from French entities has proven woefully
inadequate to the task. As the tide of data protectionism in France continues to
rise, ongoing efforts to extract discovery from French entities in contravention
of French blocking statutes will continue to generate cross-border tension. As a
result, the U.S. Supreme Court should reverse itself and restore the Hague
Conventions to their proper place as the prime avenue for securing cross-border
discovery.

